

Price of Trust

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(joint work with A. Gheorghiu and P. Walden)

TQI 2016 Workshop

University of Edinburgh


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


Quantum Machines



- These devices become relevant when they are no longer classically simulatable
- **Efficient** verification methods for testing quantum devices ?

Quantum Verification



- Computationally limited verifier
- Powerful quantum server(s)
- Certify the correctness of the computation

Single server

- Restricted quantum verifier
[Aharonov, Ben-Or, Eban '10], [Fitzsimons, Kashefi '12]
- Measurement-only verifier
[Morimae '14], [Hayashi, Morimae '15]
- Device-independent verifier
[Gheorghiu, Kashefi, Wallden '15], [Hajdusek, Perez-Delgado, Fitzsimons '15]
- Classical verifier
open problem

Existing approaches (with Privacy)

Single server

- Restricted quantum verifier
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Non-communicating, entangled servers

- Classical verifier, 2 servers
[Reichardt, Unger, Vazirani '12]
- Classical verifier, multiple servers
[McKague '13]

Universal

- Post hoc verification [*Morimae, Fitzsimons '16*], [*Fitzsimons, Hajdusek '15*]
- Direct certification of quantum simulations [*Hangleiter, Kliesch, Schwarz, Eisert '16*]

Existing approaches (without Privacy)

Universal


- Post hoc verification [*Morimae, Fitzsimons '16*], [*Fitzsimons, Hajdusek '15*]
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non-Universal


- IQP Hypothesis Testing [*Bremner, Shepherd '08*]
- Boson Sampling Hypothesis Testing [*Spagnolo et. al. '14*]
- Verification of one-clean Qubit Model
[*Kapourniotis, Kashefi, Datta '14*]

Assumptions

- Prepare and send vs. entanglement-based
- Single vs. multiple servers
- Online vs. offline
- Device-independent vs. one-sided device-independent
- I.i.d. states vs. general states
- Privacy preserving vs non-hiding
- Universal vs non-universal
- And others



The price of trust


A man with grey hair, wearing a dark suit and tie, is looking down at a quiz overlay. The overlay is a blue-bordered box with a black background and white text. It contains a question and four multiple-choice options labeled A, B, C, and D.

What is the worst-case round complexity of a device-independent quantum verification protocol?

♦A: $O(N^{64})$ ♦B: $O(N^{2048})$

♦C: $O(N^{8192})$ ♦D: $O(N^{22})$

The price of trust



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Central question


How do trust assumptions affect the complexity of the protocol?

Prepare and send - Outline

Protocols such as those of: [*Aharonov, Ben-Or, Eban '10*],
[*Fitzsimons, Kashefi '12*] (FK)

Prepare and send - Outline



Protocols such as those of: [Aharonov, Ben-Or, Eban '10], [Fitzsimons, Kashefi '12] (FK)



- Verifier *prepares and sends* quantum states to server
- Verifier instructs server on how to use the states for a computation
- They interact classically
- W.h.p. verifier accepts correct result or aborts



Prepare and send - Characteristics

- Minimally quantum verifier (trusted preparation device)
- Prepared states are qubits or qudits (no entanglement) [Dunjko, Kashefi '16]
- Can achieve **linear** classical round complexity and one-shot quantum communication complexity [Kashefi, Wallden '15]



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Towards entanglement-based

Replace preparation device with trusted entanglement + measurement device.

Single server

- Verifier has only measurement device
- Shared entanglement between verifier and server
- Measurement + entanglement *mimic prepare and send*


Single server

- Verifier has only measurement device
- Shared entanglement between verifier and server
- Measurement + entanglement *mimic prepare and send*

Multiple servers

- Verifier has no quantum device
- Servers share entanglement and *cannot communicate*
- Verifier interacts classically with servers

Multiple servers



Multiple servers price of trust

Constant number of servers

- Protocol: [Reichardt, Unger, Vazirani '12]
- Round complexity: $O(N^{8192})$
- Based on rigidity of CHSH games
- Certifying entanglement and measurements
- Huge overhead for establishing tensor product of Bell pairs

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
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Measurements are always untrusted (performed by servers)

Single server



Single server price of trust

Protocols: [*Gheorghiu, Kashefi, Wallden '15*], [*Hajdušek, Pérez-Delgado, Fitzsimons '15*], [*Gheorghiu, Wallden, Kashefi '15*]

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Entanglement Measurements	Trusted	Semi-trusted (i.i.d.)	Untrusted
Trusted	$O(N)$	$O(N^4 \log N)$	$O(N^{13} \log(N))$
Untrusted	$O(N^4 \log N)$	$O(N^4 \log N)$	$O(N^{64})$

Bounds are not tight!

Single server price of trust

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
Assuming untrusted entanglement...

Untrusted measurements → **device independence**

Trusted measurements → **one-sided device independence**


Device-independent single server verification

- Based on rigidity of CHSH games
[Reichardt, Unger, Vazirani '12]
- Certify tensor product of Bell pairs
- Certify correct measurements
- Verified preparation = prepare input states
- Verified computation = FK protocol
- Similar in multi server setting




One-sided device-independent single server verification

- Based on rigidity of steering games
[Gheorghiu, Wallden, Kashefi '16]
- Certify tensor product of Bell pairs
- Certify correct server measurements
- Analogous to DI protocols
- Reduced overhead because of added trust




Rigidity

- Saturating correlations determines states and strategy
- Up to local isometry
- DI \rightarrow non-local correlations (CHSH)
- 1sDI \rightarrow steering correlations



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Proof idea:

- 1 Self-testing with i.i.d. states
- 2 Removing i.i.d. assumption (one shot rigidity)
- 3 Game-based induction \rightarrow state and strategy determination

Self-testing i.i.d. states

Suppose Alice and Bob share many copies of a state $|\psi\rangle$

Alice measures observables A'_0, A'_1


Bob measures observables B'_0, B'_1

Self-testing i.i.d. states

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


Self-testing i.i.d. states

Suppose Alice and Bob share many copies of a state $|\psi\rangle$

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$$\langle\psi| A'_0 B'_0 + A'_0 B'_1 + A'_1 B'_0 - A'_1 B'_1 |\psi\rangle \geq 2\sqrt{2} - \epsilon \quad (1)$$


$$\langle\psi| A_0 B'_0 + A_1 B'_1 |\psi\rangle \geq 2 - \epsilon \quad (2)$$

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$$\langle\psi| A'_0 B'_0 + A'_0 B'_1 + A'_1 B'_0 - A'_1 B'_1 |\psi\rangle \geq 2\sqrt{2} - \epsilon \quad (1)$$


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Self-testing theorem


If inequality 1 is satisfied in the DI case, or inequality 2 in the 1sDI case, then there exists a local isometry $\Phi = \Phi_A \otimes \Phi_B$ such that, for all $M'_A \in \{I, A'_0, A'_1\}$, $N'_B \in \{I, B'_0, B'_1\}$:

$$\|\Phi(M'_A N'_B |\psi\rangle) - |junk\rangle M_A N_B |\phi_+\rangle\| \leq O(\sqrt{\epsilon})$$

Removing i.i.d.




Removing i.i.d.



- 1 Model measurement process as a *martingale*
- 2 Use Azuma-Hoeffding inequality
- 3 Observed correlation close to true correlation for averaged state: $\rho_{avg} = \frac{1}{K} \sum_i \rho_i$
- 4 From self-testing ρ_{avg} is close to $|\phi_+\rangle$ (under isometry)
- 5 Optimization argument implies a randomly chosen ρ_i is also close to $|\phi_+\rangle$

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Non-i.i.d. self-testing theorem

If Alice and Bob's correlation saturates the CHSH/steering inequality to order ϵ then for a randomly chosen i :

$$\|\Phi(\mathcal{E}'_{AB}(\rho_i)) - \mathcal{E}_{AB}(|\phi_+\rangle \langle \phi_+|)\| \leq O(\epsilon^{1/6})$$

State and strategy determination


Suppose we play K games to certify one Bell pair.
Does playing NK games certify N pairs?

State and strategy determination

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Not implicitly, because of overlap...




State and strategy determination

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- Assume the state and strategy of Alice and Bob is $\mathcal{S}_{real} = (\rho_{AB}, \mathcal{E}'_A, \mathcal{E}'_B)$
- Assume the ideal strategy is $\mathcal{S}_{id} = (\otimes |\phi_+\rangle, \mathcal{E}_A, \mathcal{E}_B)$
- Can consider intermediate strategies \mathcal{S} (e.g. Alice guesses Bob's outcomes)
- Use non-i.i.d. self testing to show $\mathcal{S}_{real} \approx \mathcal{S} \approx \mathcal{S}_{id}$
- Closeness **depends on whether Alice is trusted or not!**
- $DI \rightarrow O(N^{64})$, $1sDI \rightarrow O(N^{13} \log(N))$

Necessity of Bell pairs

Assume we have an entanglement-based protocol, \mathcal{P} , satisfying the following:

- One-sided device-independent
- Shared entangled state consists of copies of 2-qubit state ρ_{VP}
- Blindness, $\text{Tr}_V(\rho_{VP}) = \rho_P = I/2$
- Arbitrary quantum input

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Proof: From the constraints, we find that:

$$\rho_{VP} = \frac{1}{2(|f|^2 + 1)} \begin{pmatrix} |f|^2 & f & f & e^{i\phi_1}|f|^2 \\ f^* & 1 & e^{i\phi_2} & -f \\ f^* & e^{-i\phi_2} & 1 & -f \\ e^{-i\phi_1}|f|^2 & -f^* & -f^* & |f|^2 \end{pmatrix}$$

$\text{Tr}(\rho_{VP}^2) = 1$ and $\text{Tr}_V(\rho_{VP}) = I/2 \rightarrow \rho_{VP}$ is maximally entangled!

Prepare and send $\rightarrow O(N)$

Conclusions

Prepare and send $\rightarrow O(N)$

Online, measurement-only $\rightarrow O(N)$

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Entanglement-based, single server

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Untrusted	$O(N^4 \log N)$	$O(N^4 \log N)$	$O(N^{64})$

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Online, measurement-only $\rightarrow O(N)$

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Untrusted	$O(N^4 \log N)$	$O(N^4 \log N)$	$O(N^{64})$

Entanglement-based, multiple servers

Constant number of servers $\rightarrow O(N^{8192})$

Linear number of servers $\rightarrow O(N^{22})$

Open problems

- Tight bounds?
- Bounded quantum memory adversary?
- No communication vs. space-like separation
- Fault tolerance?
- Classical client single server verification?

References and further reading

Presentation based primarily on this work:

[Gheorghiu, Kashefi, Wallden, '15] - arXiv:1512.07401

Other relevant works:

[Hoban, Šupić '16] - arXiv:1601.01552

[Kashefi, Wallden '15] - arXiv:1510.07408

[Kapourniotis, Dunjko, Kashefi '15] - arxiv:1506.06943

[Gheorghiu, Kashefi, Wallden '15] - arXiv:1502.02571

[Reichardt, Unger, Vazirani '12] - arXiv:1209.0448

[Morimae '12] - arXiv:1208.1495

[McKague, Yang, Scarani '12] - arXiv:1203.2976